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Unleashing the Power of the States:
Broadening the Preemption Waiver so States
are Empowered to Combat Vehicle Emissions
*

Eric M. Feldpausch
INTRODUCTION

The Clean Air Act (CAA), adopted in its contemporary form
in 1970, "comprise(s) one of the most intricate regulatory schemes
in existence."' Congress explicitly recognized that "the growth in
the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of
motor vehicles" resulted in "mounting dangers" to public health
and welfare. 2 This Note focuses on the CAA's provisions concerning
motor vehicle emissions and the legislation's impact on global
warming.
The CAA categorizes motor vehicle emissions under the
term "mobile sources." 3 Engine combustion and fuel evaporation
from cars generates more than half of the United States' air
pollution. 4 Frighteningly, mobile sources are also responsible for
nearly half of an individual's cancer risk as a consequence of their
emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs), which include any
pollutant known or suspected to cause cancer or other serious
health effects.5 Congress recognized that to protect the country's
air, promote public health, and the productivity of society as a
whole, 6 mobile sources of air pollution needed to be regulated.7
Therefore, Congress passed § 202(b) of the CAA Amendments of

*Senior Staff Editor, KY. J. OF EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L., 2018-2019;
B.A. 2011, Kentucky Wesleyan College; M.B.A. 2013, University of Louisville; J.D. expected
May 2019, University of Kentucky.
I RICHARD L. REVESz, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, 315 (3d ed. 2015).

42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(a)(2) (West 2017).
REVESZ, supra note 1, at 463.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(b)(1).
7 Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2

3
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1970, providing that, beginning in 1975, vehicle exhaust emissions
must be reduced.8
Under the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) administrator is required to prescribe-and from time to
time revise-emissions standards for new motor vehicles "which in
his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."
The standards take effect only after the requisite technology has
been developed and applied-a time period the administrator sets
because of the high costs of compliance. 10 While the CAA provisions
described here focus predominantly on regulating new motor
vehicles, regulation of existing mobile source emissions is
primarily accomplished under State Implementation Plans
(SIPs).11 Common measures of control found in SIPs include
enhanced vehicle inspection and maintenance programs,12
transportation planning, 13 and clean fuel programs. 14
Congress has approached the issue by requiring nationally
uniform standards for regulating new vehicle emissions.1 5 States
are expressly preempted from adopting any standard related to the
control of emissions from new motor vehicles by the clear language
of § 209(a) of the CAA. 16 While federal preemption is a familiar
subject for those with a legal education, it is helpful to note that
the Supremacy Clause of the United Constitution requires that
federal law preempt state law.1 7 For the purpose of this writing,
preemption means that Congress alone can set new vehicle
emissions standards.18 Moreover, states cannot decide unilaterally
whether the risks of mobile source emissions are so grave that

8 Id.

9 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(1)
10 Id. § 7521(a)(2).

(West 2017).

11 REVESZ, supra note 1, at 315.

42 U.S.C.A. § 7511a(a)(2)(B)(i) (West 2017).
§ 93.118(a) (West 2017).
14 See 40 C.F.R. § 5 1.100(z); see also 46 Tex. Prac., Environmental Law § 23:4 (2d
ed.) (demonstrating the state of Texas' efforts to implement the TxLED Program, a clean
fuel program).
15 REVESZ, supra note 1, at 469.
12

13 40 C.F.R.

16

42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(a).

17

148 Am. Jur. Trials 211 (2017); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
42 U.S.C.A § 7543(a) (Westlaw).

18
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further regulation, or even a prohibition, is appropriate to protect
citizens.1 9
However, there is one important exception codified in
§ 209(b)(1) of the CAA that allows the EPA administrator to waive
federal preemption of California's emissions standards existing
before March 30, 1966, "if the State determines that the State
standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public
health and welfare as applicable Federal standards." 20 Because
California enacted such standards within that time frame, it can
file waiver requests with the EPA. 2 1 Additionally, under § 177 of
the CAA, the forty-nine other states are authorized to adopt
California's mobile source standards in lieu of the federal
standards if they are identical to California's, and if two years pass
before commencement of the standards to allow manufacturers
22
time to bring that model year of vehicle into compliance.
In ardent support of Congress's purpose to regulate mobile
source emissions, this Note proposes an amendment to the
preemption provisions and aims to persuade those currently in
positions to effectuate such change that there has never been a
more urgent time than the present to take action. This Note
proposes to amend the preemption language of § 209(b)(1) of the
CAA to instead allow all fifty states a waiver of federal preemption
where the state determines its standards will be as protective as
applicable federal ones. 2 3 Expanding this privilege to avoid
preemption of all states, and not just of California, will promote
state sovereignty and the self-determination of its citizenry
without threatening long held principles of federalism. 24 It Will
increase pressure on vehicle manufacturers to invest in vehicles
with lower emissions, accelerate the transition to zero-emissions

'9 Id.

- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223).
21

Velicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, U.S. ENVIRONMEN-

TAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emis-

23,
2017)
June
updated
(last
sions-california-waivers-and-authorizations
[https://perma.ceiSW9J-GHF4].
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223).
- 42 U.S.C.A § 7543(b)(1) (Westlaw).
?A Adam H. Kurland, FirstPrinciples ofAmerican Federalism and the Nature of
FederalCriminalJurisdiction,45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996).
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vehicles, 25 support the overarching goals of the CAA, and represent
a major step toward tackling the global challenge of climate
change. 26
Critics of this proposal will likely argue that the § 177
provision allowing forty-nine states to adopt the more stringent
California standardS 27 is the most effective way of balancing the
interests of interstate commerce with the concern for health and
environmental risks to the state and its citizens. 28 Other critics
seem likely to argue that this change will make little difference in
the fight against global warming and that political capital would
be better spent on changes that would have a more robust effect on
the environment after centuries of human pollution.2 9 Still other
critics seem likely to argue that fifty-one separate emissions
standards would place an unbearable burden on automakers and
bankrupt an industry that is a vital cog in the economic machine
of our nation.3 0 Forecasting such valid concerns is an important
step in the ongoing debate regarding what ameliorative measures
should be taken.
This Note addresses these issues and seeks to offer a
minimally disruptive proposal to federalism and to industry, while
the enormous
risks-particularly
tackling environmental
challenge of global warming-and human health concerns caused
by vehicle emissions. Part I paints a grim picture of just how
harmful mobile source emissions are to human health and the
planet. This section will also discuss the need for regulation in this
area. Part II begins by outlining many ways in which the current
law falls short. It will further attempt to allay concerns of

25See Nissan Leaf NISSAN,

https://www.nissanusa.comelectric-cars/2018-leaf/

[https://perma.cc/L3XA-SQBZ; see also 2018 Toyota Mirai Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle,
TOYOTA, https://ssl.toyota.com/mirailfcv.html [https://perma.cc/D3SX-LKTS].
26CJimate
Change
as
a
Global
Challenge,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/ga/president/61/followup/climatechange/ClimateChangeBackgroundPaper.pdf [https://perma.ccl5XAX-TNTU].
27 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507.
mSee Tara A. Stanton, The Battle over the Electric Car: The Big Three v. the
Northeastern States, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 553 (1995).
https://www.britanENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
nIndustrial Revolution,
nica.com/event/Industrial-Revolution (last updated Sept. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cclXT36-

H4XRI.
* Coral Davenport, EPA Takes a Major Step to Roll Back Clean Car Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/climate/epa-car-pollution-rollback.html [https://perma.cclQY6K-JC5R].
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burdening interstate commerce if changes are incorporated and
outline a proposal for changing the current law. Part II concludes
by providing precedent for such a change and discusses the
expected outcomes. This Note concludes with a call to action aimed
at current legislators and aspiring ones.
I. THE DANGER OF VEHICLE EMISSIONS AND THE STATE'S ROLE IN
REGULATING THEM

It often seems like the political will to act is scarce until the
gravest of circumstances is upon the electorate. Climate scientists
have studied the human contribution to global warming and
warned of its resulting effects as far back as the nineteenth century
when Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish chemist, calculated that if
carbon dioxide emissions doubled, the earth's surface temperature
would increase by 5.5oF to 9oF. 31 In 2014, the United Nations'
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which
evaluates input from scientists across the globe, released an
assessment concluding that even if fossil-fuel emissions halted
entirely, some climate change effects will still "continue for
centuries." 32 Despite the fact that the United Nations' IPCC had
been analyzing and reporting on the effects of climate change since
1990, the global community was not spurred to any form of serious
action until 2016 when the Paris Climate Agreement was signed
by 175 countries. 3 3
This progress may be short-lived, however. President
Donald Trump's administration pulled the United States out of the
Paris Agreement in 2018 and appointed an EPA administrator
who is skeptical of climate science and has plans to substantially

31 Rudy Baum Sr., The First Climate Change Believer, SCIENCE HISTORY INSTIhttps://www.chemheritage.org/distillations/magazine/future-calculations
(2016),
TUTE
[https://perma.cc/68HT-D2YH].
3 Joby Warrick and Chris Mooney, Effects of Climate Change 'Irreversible,'U.N.
Panel Warns in Report, THE WASHINGTON POST (November 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/effects-ofclimate-change-irreversible-un-panel-warnsin-report/2014/11/01/2d49aeec-6142-1 1e4-8b9e2ccdac31a031_story.html?utm term=.ba600abl5ce3 (Nov. 2, 2014) [https://perma.cclYQ9STAYP].
, Id.; List of Parties that Signed the Paris Agreement on 22 April, UNITED NATIONS, (April 2016) http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/04/parisagreementsingatures/ [https://perma.cc/BS96-LRHS].
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curb the agency's role in fighting pollution. 34 This Note calls
attention to these frustrating setbacks in hopes of sparking
proactivity. Our generation must avoid the failings of our
predecessors by acting swiftly to overcome the challenge of global
warming.
For those not yet convinced by the United Nation's reports,
or the news media's depictions of the problem, the following
discussion will highlight the adverse effects of mobile source
emissions on human health and the environment. The nonprofit
Health Effects Institute, an organization financed jointly by the
EPA and the auto industry, analyzed 700 peer-reviewed,
international studies that focused on different aspects of motor
vehicle emissions and health prior to issuing a report in 2010.35
The report found evidence of a causal relationship between
exposure to traffic pollution and lung-function impairment, as well
as strong evidence that this pollution may accelerate hardening of
the arteries, exacerbate asthma in children, and cause variations
in heart rate that result in deaths.3 6 The study found that the
effects were most acutely felt among people who lived within a
quarter of a mile of highways and major roads, which includes
more than 100 million individuals in North America. 3 7
Moreover, the EPA has noted that nearly half of outdoor
toxic emissions and cancer risks are attributable to mobile
sources. 38 Despite these daunting figures, the EPA recognized that
toxic emissions are projected to decline in the future due to the
implementation of its standards.3 9 Such hopeful projections,
however, do not remove the cancer risk associated with these

3 Evan Halper, Trump's EPA Pick Casts Doubt on California'sPower to Regulate
Auto Emissions, L.A. TIMEs (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-napol-epa-confirmation-20170118-story.html
[https://perma.cclL973-2G2L];
Michael D.
Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, (June 1,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-cimate-agreement.html
[https://perma.cc/S36Z-GUXB
3 Matthew L. Wald, Report Links Vehicle Exhaust to Health Problems, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/health/research/13exhaust.html
[https://perma.ce/3V5F-MNVZ].
36 Id.
' Id.
3 Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg. 8428,
8434 (Feb. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 40 CFR Parts 59, 80, 85, and 86).

3

Id.
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emissions without additional controls. 40 The EPA anticipates that
by 2030, a significant increase of individuals will be exposed to the
highest risk levels of mobile source air toxins (MSATs).41 With the
number of new cancer cases expected to rise by about seventy
percent over the next two decades, 42 it is time to take this deadly
health risk more seriously.
Although pollution has a profound negative effect on
human health, the adverse effects of mobile source emissions on
the environment cannot be understated. The Fifth Assessment
Report from the IPCC found that fourteen percent of 2010 global
greenhouse gas emissions were produced by the transportation
sector, primarily from "fossil fuels burned for road, rail, air, and
marine transportation." 43 While modern advances in fuel
technology are on the horizon, nearly all "of the world's
transportation energy comes from petroleum-based fuels, largely
gasoline and diesel."" The report found that the transportation
sector was responsible for the quickest growth in direct greenhouse
gas emissions globally-a 120 percent increase between 1970 and
2004.45 Perhaps more striking is the fact that while the global
transportation sector is responsible for nearly one third of
greenhouse gas emissions, the sector "represents less than one of
every twelve tons of projected emission reductions." 46 A Carnegie
Endowment Report found that on-road transportation has the
greatest negative effect on climate in the short term, primarily
because of two distinctive on-road transportation traits: "nearly
exclusive use of petroleum fuels, the combustion of which results
in high levels of the principal warming gases (carbon dioxide,
ozone, and black carbon); and minimal emissions of sulfates,

4 Id.
41 Id. (The estimate of Americans above the ten-in-a-million cancer risk level from
exposure to MSATs is projected to increase from 223 million in 1999 to 272 million in 2030).
42 CancerFactsheet, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://afro.who.int/health-topics/cancer (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7QGT-XPZU.
4

Global

Greenhouse

Gas

Emissions Data,

ENVTL.

PROT.

AGENCY,

https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data (last visited Oct.
1, 2018) [https://perma.cclM.K2Y-5NAR].
4 Id.
4 Deborah Gordon, The Role of Transportationin Driving Climate Disruption,
117 CARNEGIE PAPERS: ENERGY AND CLIMATE PROGRAM 1 (Dec. 2010), https://carne-

gieendowment.org/files/transport-climate-disruption.pdf [https://perma.cclYA65-JL-AH].
4
Id.
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aerosols, and organic carbon from on-road transportation sources
to counterbalance warming with cooling effects." 47
Because global warming is an international challenge, it
requires a statistical analysis focusing on global observations and
trends. For any detractor that may argue that the focus of any
potential U.S. policy change should be predicated solely on
domestic evidence of impact, this Note submits the glaring
observation that the United States is the clear leader in both GHG
emissions and contributions to global warming, having "pumped
more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than any other nation
between 1850 and 2014."48 Furthermore, the United States
remains the second-largest global emitter of carbon dioxidetrailing only China-despite major efforts to curb emissions, shift
consumer behaviors, increasing political activism, and rapidly
advancing technologies across almost every industry.4 9

II. SOLUTIONS TO THE MOBILE-SOURCE PROBLEM
A. Lack of Industry Incentives Creates the Need for Regulation
Automobile
manufacturers'
main objective
is the
enhancement of both corporate profit and shareholder gain, just
like all of their corporate peers.5 0 Other pursuits, such as public
welfare, humanitarianism, education, and philanthropy are
merely permissive, and corporate directors are bound to exercise
such secondary pursuits within a reasonableness framework,

7 Id.
4 Nadja Popovich, Who's Most Responsible for Global Warming?, THE NEW YORK

TIMES, (April 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/climate/countries-responsible-global-warming.html [https://perma.cc/AL3C-T5P7].
9

Global

Greenhouse

Gas

Emissions

Data,

ENVTL.

https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data
1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/MK2Y-5NAR].

PROT.

AGENCY,

(last visited Oct.

5 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.0 1(a)
(AM. LAW. INST. 1994); Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing shareholder value: The goal that
changed corporate America, The Washington Post, (August 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.comlbusiness/economy/maximizing-shareholder-value-the-goal-that-changedcorporate-america/20 13/08/26/26e9ca8e-ed74- 11e2-900861e94a7ea20d story.html?utm term=.4befl84846eb [https://perma.cc/QUU4-UPK2].
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51
always keeping in mind the primary objective of profits.
Understanding this hierarchy of corporate decision lends support
to the promulgation of regulations in this case.
Although congressional concern over the problem of
automotive emissions dates back to the 1950s, it was not until the
passage of the CAA in 1965 that Congress established that the
52
federal government would control regulation in this area. The
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
testified in 1967 that "the state of the art has tended to meander
along until some sort of regulation took it by the hand and gave it
a good pull . .. There has been a long period of waiting for it, and
it hasn't worked very well." 5 3 D.C. Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal
described the pace of the development of emission control
technology by the automobile industry during this period as
proceeding "haltingly."54 Judge Leventhal also noted that "(t)he
legislative background must also take into account the fact that in
1969 the Department of Justice brought suit against the four
largest automobile manufacturers on grounds that they had
5
conspired to delay the development of emission control devices."
The legislative history describing the actions taken by the
automobile industry in the early stages of regulation should not
come as a surprise given the priority of profits over all else.
Although the maximization of profit is often proclaimed as a law of
capitalism, and this approach deserves praise for driving
businesses to create products that consumers want, for employing
vast swaths of the economy, and for motivating banks to lend, it
also turns a blind eye to societal priorities such as shrinking
56
income inequality or maintaining a clean environment.

5i PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 2.01(b)

(AM. LAW. INST. 1994).
52 Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d at 622.
53 Id. at 622-23.

5 Id.
ss Id. at 623 (referencingUnited States v. Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n., 307
F.Supp. 617 (C.D.Cal. 1969), affd sub nom. City of New York v. United States, et al., 397
U.S. 248, 90 S.Ct. 1105, 25 L.Ed.2d 280 (1970)).
- Barack Obama, The way ahead, THE ECONOMIST, (Oct. 8, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/Z4UGhttps://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/10/08/the-way-ahead
LDVU]; Henry Blodget, Time for a better capitalism, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Jun. 14, 2016),
https://www.businessinsider.com/time-for-a-better-capitalism-2016-6
[https://perma.cc/M6T5-96SG.
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Opponents of regulation often argue that the "invisible hand" of
the market will guide auto manufacturers toward more fuelefficient standards as consumer demand shifts, and that we would
be better to wait for the natural market shift than bear the burden
of heavy regulation.5 7 History should color us all skeptics to this
argument, particularly as demand for more efficient vehicles ebbs
and flows with the price of gasoline.5 8
Recognizing that emissions from mobile sources are
harmful and that the problem of global warming is reaching an
irreversible point, government regulation was and remains
necessary to force progress toward lowering emissions. With profit
as an incentive, the auto industry cannot be trusted to advance fast
enough to meet the vast environmental and public health crisis we
face today. Therefore, Congress properly enacted a technologyforcing standard to mandate a powerfully reluctant automobile
industry.5 9
B. Shortcomings of the CurrentLaw
As previously described, the current law allows California
to seek waivers from preemption if it adopts more stringent vehicle
emission standards than the federal standards, and affords the
remaining forty-nine states the right to enact California's exact
standards.6 0 This law has undoubtedly opened additional avenues
through which states might pursue air quality control measures,

5 Deepa Seetharaman, MPG forecast:Automakers weigh regulation vs. demand,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/autos/ct-xpm-2014-0115-sns-mpg-forecast-automakers-weigh-regulation-vs-demand-20140116-story.html
[https://perma.cctPG4L-PL6Ul.
* Paul A. Eisenstein, Low gas prices dent demand for fuel-efficient cars, CNBC,
(Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/14/gas-prices-dent-demand-for-fuel-efficient-cars.html [https://perma.cc/EW4V-3BP3]; High gas prices motivate drivers to change
direction,

CONSUMER

REPORTS,

(May

2012),

https://www.consumerre-

ports.org/crol2012/05/high-gas-prices-motivate-drivers-to-change-directionlindex.htm
[https://perma.cc/F6UC-M9WUl; Nicholas Rossolillo, HowAre Gas PricesAffectingU.S. Automakers?, THE MOTLEY FOOL, (May 10, 2016), https://www.fool.comlinvesting/general/2016/05/10/how-are-gas-prices-affecting-us-automakers.aspx
[https://perma.ccR46U72W6].
* REVESZ, supra note 1, at 468.

- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b) (West 2017); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507 (West 2017).
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but challenges remain that prevent states from fully executing
their plans to control pollution.
One shortcoming of the current law is that the waiver must
be granted by the EPA-a process that is still subject to political
risks. The EPA administrator has the discretion to deny the
preemption waiver if, among other reasons, the administrator
determines the state does not need more stringent standards to
meet "compelling and extraordinary" conditions.6 ' In 2005,
California sought a waiver from the EPA that would allow it to
regulate motor vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases, which the
EPA delayed in deciding while Massachusetts v. EPA was waiting
decision before the Supreme Court. 6 2 Despite the Court holding
that the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles, 63 in 2008, under President
George W. Bush's administration, the administrator formally
and
waiver finding no "compelling
refused California's
64
Obama
the
2009,
In
circumstances."
extraordinary
Administration directed the EPA to reconsider the waiver request,
eventually overruling its previous decision and deciding to grant
the waiver.65
Although California has requested-and has been
granted-more than fifty waivers since 1977,66 political
uncertainty remains. The EPA is led by an administrator
appointed by the president,6 7 and therefore reflects the political
ideals of the party in power. Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
dissenting in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., approved of an agency changing its mind with
the election of a new president.6 8 Given the overwhelming scientific
evidence concerning mobile source emissions, climate change, and
its impact on human health, there seems to be no "rational

6

42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b)(1)(B).
REVESZ, supra note 1, at 479-80.
Massachusetts v. E.P.A, 549 U.S. 497, 497 (2007).

64

REVESZ, supra note 1, at 480.

61
62

65 Id.
6 Id. at 479, (citing U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-09-249R , Clean Air
Act; Historical Information on EPA's Process for Reviewing California Waiver requests
(2009)).
67 40 C.F.R. § 1.23 (2017).
6 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 59 (1983).
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connection between facts and judgment required to pass muster
under the arbitrary and capricious standard" for any denial of a
waiver.6 9 Yet, the risk of political influence on these waiver
decisions prevent states from implementing higher emission
control standards, as seen in 2008, and may also dissuade or delay
states from applying for waivers. Additionally, given the current
administration's disdain for climate science-having appointed a
climate change denialist as EPA administratorUo-it seems a
finding of "compelling and extraordinary circumstances" over the
next four years is unlikely.
A second shortcoming of the current law is the threat posed
by the powerful automotive industry. States other than California
seeking to adopt more stringent standards than the federal
emissions limits are required to adopt emissions standards
identical California's.7 1 This requirement opens states up to
scrutiny and challenge by the auto industry-a problem
exacerbated by California's shifting emissions standards. The
auto-industry has mounted several successful challenges on this
specific issue against states attempting to adopt California's
emissions limits. 7 2 A prominent example of such a scenario played
out in the 1990s as California adopted emissions standards
focusing on "zero-emissions vehicles" (ZEVs) under the state's
more comprehensive "low-emission vehicle" (LEV) program, which
was granted a § 209(b) waiver by the EPA a few years later. 73
and New York replicated
Subsequently,
Massachusetts
California's program pursuant to § 177 of the CAA. 7 4 After three
years of operation under the waiver, California revoked the ZEV
portion of its LEV program because it was feckless.7 5 Due to the
repeal of the ZEV sales requirement for model years 1998-2002,

6
70

Id. at 56.

Coral Davenport and Eric Lipton, Trump Picks Scott Pruitt, Climate Change
Denialist, to Lead E.P.A.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
7,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/us/politics/scott-pruitt-epa-trump.html
[https://perma.cclYS94-

WAMJ].
W7 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507(1) (2017).
REVESZ, supra note 1, at 480.
Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm'r, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 2000).
74 Id.; Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1998).
75
Ass'n oflnt'l Auto. Mfrs., 208 F.3d at 3.
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California entered into individual Memorandums of Agreement
("MOAs") with seven of the largest automobile manufacturers.7 6
Shortly thereafter, the auto industry seized the opportunity
to challenge both New York's and Massachusetts' ZEV sales
requirements. In American Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n v.
Cahill, the Court held that "[olther states cannot opt-in to a
California standard that no longer exists."7 7 Therefore, New York's

ZEV sales requirement was preempted by § 209 of the CAA and
the auto industry prevailed in challenging New York's standards.78
Massachusetts met a similar fate in Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers v. Commissioner, Massachusetts
Department ofEnvironmentalProtection,despite having amended
its ZEV mandates to reflect the automaker's obligations under the
MOAs. 7 9

In

Association

of

International

Automobile

Manufacturers, the Court held that California's MOAs were not
"standards" for purposes of § 177 of the CAA.8 0 Therefore,
Massachusetts' regulations purporting to copy California's MOAs
were not "identical to California standards for which a waiver
[had] been granted" and were consequently preempted."' These
cases demonstrate the scrutiny a state regulation may face due to
California's ever-changing emission standards. Therefore, state
legislators must constantly monitor California's laws for any
subtle change and must be prepared for the inevitable challenge
by well-funded automotive industry interest groups.
The current law also falls short because of the court's broad
interpretation of the scope of federal preemption power under §
209, which pre-empts " any pre-sale regulation of motor vehicleseven if a state is merely attempting to enforce a federal standard
or enforcement mechanism through state regulation."8 2 This
interpretation was on display in Engine Man ufacturersAss'n v.
South CoastAir Quality ManagementDistrict. In Engine, the Air
Quality Management District was responsible under state law for
air pollution control in Los Angeles and enacted six "Fleet Rules"

Id.; Cahill, 152 F.3d at 199.
Cahill, 152 F.3d at 201.
78 Id.
79
Ass'n ofInt'l Auto. Mfrs., 208 F.3d at 3-4.
8 Id. at 8.
76
7

81
82

nd.

REVESZ, supra note 1, at 477.
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to address said pollution.83 The Fleet Rules prohibited some
private and public fleet operators from purchasing or leasing
vehicles that did not comply with emission requirements. 84 The
Court held that the Fleet Rules were not entirely outside the preemptive reach of § 209(a) and applied the preemption provision
broadly.8 5
Strongly opposing the Court's broad interpretation, Justice
David Souter summed up the significance of the Court's ruling in
one sentence: "[tihe Court holds that preemption by the Clean Air
Act . . . prohibits one of the most polluted regions in the United
States from requiring private fleet operators to buy clean engines
that are readily available on the commercial market." 86 Souter
continued to critique the Court's interpretation of the CAA in his
dissent, arguing that it had no preemptive application to the
District's fleet purchase requirement and that the federal
government effectively disabled the states from engaging in the
same project.8 7 The "standards" that § 209(a) preempts,
accordingly, are production mandates imposed directly on
manufacturers as a condition of sale and § 209(a) simply does not
speak to regulations that govern a vehicle buyer's choice between
various commercially available options.8 8 The Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of the CAA's preemption provision precludes
a vast range of powers traditionally left to states8 9 and is unduly
burdensome in the fight against mobile source emissions.
A fourth and final critique of the current law is its
inconsistency in approach. The CAA prohibits states from
implementing more stringent emission limitations than those
promulgated by the federal government.9 0 However, states are also
burdened with designing and enforcing emission programs to
achieve and maintain federally defined National Ambient Air

& Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 248-49
(2004) ("The District is responsible under state law for developing and implementing a'comprehensive basinwide air quality management plan' to reduce emission levels and thereby
achieve and maintain 'state and federal ambient air quality standards.).
A Id.
85 See id. at 258-59.
8 Id. at 259 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 262.
88 Id.
8 See id. at 260-63.
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223).
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Quality Standards (NAAQS).91 Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(a)(1) and
40 C.F.R. § 50.2(b), the CAA imposes upon the EPA administrator
the responsibility of promulgating primary ambient air quality
standards that have an adequate margin of safety to protect the
public health, and secondary ambient air quality standards which
the administrator deems necessary to protect the public welfare. 92
The CAA does give states the primary burden of implementing
these standards through State Implementation Plans (SIPs),
which after EPA approval become federal regulations. 93 Each SIP
must contain several elements including air quality monitoring
and reporting systems, adequate provisions to prohibit interstate
spillover, enforceable emissions limits to meet the NAAQS,
emergency powers to prevent emissions that cause "imminent
harm or substantial endangerment," along with several other
requirements. 94 As Souter properly noted, § 101 of the CAA states
that "air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination,
through any measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or
created at the source) and air pollution control at its source is the
95
primary responsibility of States and local governments."
Notwithstanding federal reliance on the resources and
enforcement mechanism of states, Congress has preempted the
regulation of mobile source emissions, taking away a powerful tool
from the states. Critics forget this legislation was created in an
effort to assist states struggling to meet federal pollution
standards by allowing other states to "piggyback" onto California's
preemption exemption for more stringent limits. 9 6 Congress still
requires achievement and maintenance of NAAQS, but much more
progress must be made at the state level-therefore it is time to
remove the preemption barrier and allow states to fully control
mobile source emissions.
The risk of imminent, harmful consequences of mobile
source pollution is frightening, especially when considering each of
the above deficiencies in the current law. Any chance of prohibition

91 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410.

- 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (2017).
People of State of Cal. v. Dep't of the Navy, 624 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1980).
9 REVESZ, supra note 1, at 346-347.
9 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 541 U.S. 246, 260.
9 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 1994).
93
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or delay of tougher standards only serves to compound the
problem.
C. Interstate Commerce Concerns
Potentially forcing auto manufacturers into burdensome
compliance with fifty-one different mobile-source emissions
standards strikes fear into the minds of legislators, business
leaders, and judges alike. Preemption is seen as a way to protect
against undue burdens on interstate commerce by limiting the
ability of states to enact their own standards.9 7 However, it
prevents citizens of those states from deciding for themselves at
what point the profound advantages of the automobile are
outweighed by the disadvantageous aspects, particularly as a
source of air pollution that threatens human health and wellbeing.9 8
Ground level ozone and carbon monoxide are created
primarily by automobiles. This kind of ozone-which functions as
a component of the familiar phenomenon of urban smog -"inhibits
the human immune system and damages otherwise healthy lung
tissue."9 9 For the reasons outlined in this section, this Note argues
that the interstate commerce fears are overblown and that the
consequences resulting from pollution vastly outweigh any
temporary decline in profits that might occur if fifty-one standards
were adopted.
First, the auto industry is more capable of meeting auto
emissions limits than they would like to admit. In fact, since the
1970 amendments, the auto industry has repeatedly met imposed
deadlines even after predictions that they would be unable to do
so.1oo Although these emissions limits are designed as technologyforcing standards to guarantee progress is being made, the CAA
requires that auto manufacturers be afforded at least two years
before commencement of the period for which the standards take

9 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 810
F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (N.D.N.Y. 1993), modified on reconsideration, 831 F. Supp. 57
(N.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994).
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc.,17 F.3d at 524.
* Id.
10 REVESZ, supra note 1, at 468.
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effect.1 01 This built-in statutory buffer period ensures that the auto
industry can come into compliance without interrupting sales.
Second, manufacturers will be incentivized by profits when
it reaches compliance with additional standards under this
proposed change. When Congress provided California a waiver for
more stringent standards, it concluded that in light of the size of
California's economy and corresponding demand for automobiles
that "this new state authority should not place an undue burden
on vehicle manufacturers who will be required, in any event, to
produce vehicles meeting the California standards for sale in
California." 10 2 Congress acknowledges that regardless of the
additional emissions limits, auto manufacturers will find a way to
comply because of the profits that would be realized in such a large
market. Concededly, the demand in California is much greater
than in smaller states such as Vermont or Montana. However,
smaller states will have the discretion to negotiate with auto
manufacturers prior to adopting more stringent regulations.
States with smaller consumer bases will perform a different set of
calculations when weighing the costs and benefits of more
stringent emissions limits and can negotiate with manufacturers
that wish to continue selling in their state.
Third, if given the opportunity to seek a preemption waiver,
states will not make decisions in isolation. The business
community remains in constant communication with governors
and state legislators, often utilizing chambers of commerce to
facilitate discussions. 103 An example of this give-and-take between
legislators and the business community was seen in the late
nineties, when California abandoned the ZEV sales requirement
for model years 1998 to 2002.104 A state's decision to enact more
stringent emission limitations will only be made after consulting
with the industries affected by the potential change in order to
ensure that the optimal balance is struck.

42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2017).
Cahil, 152 F.3d at 201.
103 See About the Kentucky Chamber, KENTUCKY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
5,
2018)
Oct.
(last visited
https://www.kychamber.comlabout-kentucky-chamber
[https://perma.cc/L6CU-HUTP]; Mission, OHIO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://ohiochamber.com/about-us/mission/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7SKP-LFHJ].
'0
Cahill, 152 F.3d at 199.
101

102
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The fourth point is a critique of assumptions.

The

Congressional enactments at issue here represent a compromise
between competing objectives: "Congress sought to permit state
regulation of new motor vehicle emissions, however, in doing so
Congress expressed a clear intent to protect motor vehicle
manufacturers from the undue burden of complying with more
than two different regulatory schemes."10 5 Legislators and courts
often argue that "[tihe purpose of this additional restriction on the
states' ability to adopt motor vehicle emissions standards was
obviously to protect the automobile industry from the undue
burden of potentially having to produce [fifty-one] different
assumes
that
automobile
This
argument
vehicles." 1 0o
manufacturers will need to invent or adopt fifty-one separate
emissions-control systems for their vehicles in order to sell them
nationwide. However, automobile manufacturers would only need
to comply with the most stringent level imposed by any one state
to be in compliance with the remaining fifty emissions limitations
standards. The carefully balanced comprise Congress reached
would be maintained and automobile manufacturers would be free
to continue selling standardized products nationwide without risk
of non-compliance if they meet the most stringent level imposed by
any one state.
Last is an argument for shifting the product mix toward
more fuel-efficient vehicles. At this point in time, almost all major
automobile manufacturers sell at least one, if not many, hybrid
electric, all electric, or zero emissions vehicles such as hydrogen
fuel cell.10 7 The federal and California emissions standards are
promulgated as "fleet averages" of emissions for the applicable
model year of each manufacturer.1 0 8 By setting exhaust and

1o-

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., 810 F. Supp. at 1338-39.

106

Id. at 1338.

See 2019 Volt: Plug-In Hybrid-Electric Car, CHEVROLET, http://www.chevrolet.com/electric/volt-plug-in-hybrid (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9QXKT8NT]; see also Nissan Leaf NIssAN, https://www.nissanusa.com/electric-cars/2018-leaf/
[https://perma.cc/L3XA-SQBZ]; see also Toyota Mirai Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle, TOYOTA,
https://ssl.toyota.com/mirailfev.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/GZU64DQM]; see also Tesla Model S, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/models (last visited Oct. 1,
2018) [https://perma.cclAM3J-78P9]; see also Fuel E15ciency: Ford Hybrids, Plug-In Hybrids & EV's, https://www.ford.com/fuel-efficient-hybrids-evs (last visited Oct. 1, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/TJD6-ALW9].
108 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.3 (2017).
10
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evaporative standards on the basis of fleet-wide averages, such
regulations allow each auto manufacturer to alter its product mix
to meet the fleet average. 109 It does not require auto manufacturers
to stop selling vehicles entirely; it merely seeks to ensure that the
vehicles sold in the new model year achieve the fleet-wide
10
average.o
There is a great economic opportunity for auto
manufacturers innovative enough to design SUVs and pickup
trucks with the fuel efficiency of a compact sedan or even a
hybrid.1 1 ' Automobile manufacturers are free to pursue this
economic opportunity without hesitation and should focus their
energy here rather than quibbling about compliance.
D. Proposalfor Change
As reiterated throughout this Note, all of this research and
debate means nothing if it does not incite action. As Harold Wilson,
former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, once said, "he who
rejects change is the architect of decay. The only human institution
that rejects progress is the cemetery." 112 The following is a
proposed plan of action consisting of simple changes to existing law
that would aid in the fight against global warming and further the
stated purpose of the emissions limits Congress sought to regulate.

First, § 209(b)(1) of the CAA should be amended to allow all
states a waiver of federal preemption. If the state determines its
own standards, in the aggregate, they will all be at least as
protective of public health and welfare as applicable federal
ones. 1 3 Next, § 177 should be amended to allow any state to peg
its standards for emissions limits to those of any other state, as
long as they have already been approved by the EPA.11 4 Third, the

'0 See John M. Broder, Obama to Toughen Rules on Emissions and Mileage, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/business/19emissions.html
[https://perma.cc/5JWG-ETK9]
110 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.3 (2017); see also Broder, supra note 109.
"i Steve Cohen, The "Can't-Dp"Approach of the American Auto Industry, EARTH
INST.: COLUMBIA U. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edul2017/03/27/the-cant-doapproach-of-the-american-auto-industry/ [https://perma.cc/Y2KE-D8R3].
112 AllAbout Change, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Dec. 14, 2011), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.comledit-page/All-About-Change/articleshow/11097542.cms
[https://perma.ccL95V-889U].
113 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b)(1) (West 2017).
114 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507.
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buffer period of two years 1 5 for any emissions standards on new
model year vehicles should be increased to three years. This
amendment would qualm fears of the auto industry. Finally, the
EPA administrator should create a mandatory duty of approval if
the state's plan is, in the aggregate, more stringent than applicable
federal standards. 116 The EPA administrator is subject to political
influence; thus, the statute should be amended to remove the
discretionary language that he or she may disapprove state
emissions limitations or fail to approve them for a lack of
compelling and extraordinary circumstances.
E. Precedentfor Proposed Changes
Congress has provided statutory exemptions from federal
law preemption to the states in various environmental-law
constructs.1 1 7 One prominent example of a statutory exemption to
the federal environmental regulatory regime is found in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which provides
that no state shall be precluded from "adopting or enforcing
requirements ... more stringent or more extensive than those
required" under the act or "operating a program with a greater
scope of coverage than that required."1 18 By establishing a viable
federal-state partnership to carry out RCRA's explicit objectives of
promoting the protection of health and the environment-while
conserving valuable material and energy resources-Congress
envisioned cooperation between the two levels of government as
they each promulgated environmental protection standards. 119
Another example of statutory exemption from federal law
preemption is found in the CAA itself, which provides that the
promulgation of national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards does not prohibit states from establishing their
own ambient air-quality standards, even if they are more stringent
than federal ones. 120 Because ambient air-quality standards are

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7507(2).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543(b)(1)(A)-(C).
'17 See 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (2018); see also 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(d).
118 40 C.F.R. § 271.1(i).
1"9 Hermes Consol., Inc. v. People, 849 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Wyo. 1993).
12 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(d).
"

116
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necessary to protect the public health and welfare, 12 1 under the
CAA the EPA administrator should define standards to protect
those who are sensitive to the effects of pollution-while erring on
the side of overprotection-regulating well beyond the known
dangers to human health. 122 It follows that if states are allowed to
set their own, more stringent ambient air-quality standards, they
have the power to provide a much broader margin of safety to their
citizens as they deem necessary.
Additionally, Congress' extension of the California mobile
source emissions exemption supports the argument that state
experimentation in the adoption of more stringent control
purpose for
measures furthers the federal government's
this
symbiotic
of
example
prominent
A
regulations.
environmental
relationship occurred when the EPA adopted a national LEV
program for new model year 2001 vehicles.1 23 After observing and
modeling the California program, the EPA adopted its standards
with slight alterations after undergoing negotiations with the
automotive industry. 124 In light of this and many other examples,
the law should actively support more state experimentation so the
federal government can collect data, weigh the pros and cons of
alternative programs, and adopt a national program that is
beneficial to all parties.
As becomes apparent from the above discussion, by
promulgating exemptions to the federal environmental regulation
regime, Congress has implicitly recognized that they further the
goals of protecting human health and lessening the threat to the
environment. By promulgating technology-forcing standards for
the regulation of mobile source emissions, Congress would
similarly further its goals of protecting the public health and
welfare by permitting state experimentation.1 2 5 Unlike many other
administrative law contexts that balance costs and benefits of
regulation, environmental regulation involves factors that can
pose significant risks to health and the environment, requiring
both state and federal actors to look beyond economic costs.

121 40 C.F.R.

§ 50.2(b).

122 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
123 REVESZ, supra note 1, at 481.
124
125

Id.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521 (West 2017).
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F. Expected Consequences if Change is Adopted
Allowing each state to decide for itself what threshold of
mobile source emissions its citizenry is willing to accept places the
task of valuing human health and balancing environmental
concerns against the auto industry's enormous economic impact.
Demand for more stringent emission standards is evidenced by the
fact that approximately a quarter of the states have used § 177 of
the CAA to adopt California's emissions standards for new motor
vehicles. 126 By logical extension, if states are granted permission
to set new vehicle emission standards based on their own costbenefit analysis, calculations, and perceptions of the political will
of its citizenry, then significantly more states would be inclined to
do so. This conclusion is further supported by the projected
calamitous consequences of global warming that will manifest with
increasing frequency each passing year that the status quo is
the automotive industry has
maintained. 127 Furthermore,
successfully challenged a state's adoption of the California
standards, demonstrating that this seemingly innocuous barrier to
stricter emissions standards has more bite than may anticipate. 128
Adopting these proposed changes would pave the way for increased
state consideration of more stringent standards and allow local
citizens to have more control over pollution-emitting vehicles sold
in their state.
This new standard would apply additional pressure to
industry by increasing the stringency of emissions limits for a
129
standard that is already characterized as "technology-forcing."
A technology-forcing standard defines reductions available using
technology the EPA determines will be available for a future model
year.13 0 In a majority opinion, Justice Leventhal wrote that "[ilt is
clear from the legislative history that Congress expected the Clean

26
1

Evan Halper, Trump's EPA Pick Casts Doubton California'sPower to Regulate
Auto Emissions, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-napol-epa-confirmation-20170118-story.html [https://perma.cc/JEY4-E6V7].
127 See Melissa Denchak, Are the Effects of Global Warming Really that Bad?,
NRDC (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/are-effects-global-warming-reallRy-bad
[https://perma.cc/55E6-PQZ8].
128 Cahill, 152 F.3d. at197.
12 REVESZ, supra note 1, at 468.
M 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521.
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Air Amendments to force the industry to broaden the scope of its
research, to study new types of engines and new control system." 13 1
In this same opinion, Leventhal noted that "it is the belief of many
experts-both in and out of the automobile industry-that air
pollution cannot be effectively checked until the industry finds a
power."1 32
automotive
conventional
the
for
substitute
Unfortunately, forty-five years since this famous opinion, the
industry remains reliant on internal combustion engines. Despite
the soaring growth of electric vehicle sales in 2016, less than one
percent of all new vehicles sold in the United States were electric
vehicles. 133 Yet, the most interesting observation from 2016
industry-wide sales is the fact that more than half of all electric
vehicle sales took place in California, a figure at least partially
driven by the state's ZEV mandate. 1 3 4 This is affirmative proof that
additional pressure on industry can have a profound impact on
forcing the adoption of new technology in line with Congress'
statutory purpose.
Additionally, technology-forcing legislation has been used
effectively to push the auto industry toward innovation in the past,
as observed by the success of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.1 3 5 The
freedom gained from automobile travel came at a high cost of
American lives and limbs.1 36 Automobiles have been the leading
cause of accidental deaths and injuries in the United States since
1929, with 46,300 American lives lost to motor vehicle accidents in
1982 alone.1 37 The Motor Vehicle Safety Act was necessary because
the industry was not reacting to the safety issues surrounding
cars. 138 The Supreme Court explained that "(t)he Act intended that
safety standards not depend on current technology and could be
'technology-forcing' in the sense of inducing the development of

Ruckelsha us, 478 F.2d at 635.
Id. at 634.
133 Robert Rapier, U.S. Electric Vehicle Sales Soared In 2016, FORBES (Feb. 5,
2017, 11:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/20 17/02/05/u-s-electric-vehicle-salessoared-in-2016/#4ae05aae2l7f [https://perma.cc/8WQZ-YLD2]; see also, Associated Press,
2016 U.S. auto sales set a new record high, led by SUVs, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 04, 2017, 3:40
http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-auto-sales-20170104-story.html
PM),
[https://perma.cc/7X3P-GUMS].
'al

132

14

Id.

135

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 32-33.

1a3 Id.
137 Id.
138

Id. at 49.
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superior safety design."13 9 Consequently, seatbelts have saved
more than 250,000 lives since 1985, while airbags have saved an
estimated additional 30,000.140 Just as the industry fought hard to
avoid federal regulation under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the
industry fights hard today to avoid perceived overbearing
emissions regulations. But the potential to accomplish great things
through technology-forcing regulation is clear and this proposed
amendment would capitalize on this reality.
The industry will argue that allowing all fifty states and the
District of Colombia an exemption from federal law preemption
will subject it to choosing winner and loser states in which it can
do business. Further, the industry is likely to argue that
compliance with fifty-one separate emissions standards is
economically impracticable, if not impossible. Fortunately, these
concerns may be alleviated by promoting the idea that the industry
need only comply with the state standard that is most restrictive
of vehicle emissions so that the manufacturer then remains
compliant in the remaining states. Additionally, shifting consumer
preferences and the rise of eco-conscious consumerism might pay
large dividends to the industry leaders that first adopt and market
products based on their reduction in emissions. 141
As noted earlier, on-road transportation has significant
short-term impacts on climate change, leading many scientists to
agree that cutting on-road transportation emissions would be
unmistakably good for the climate and public health.142
Additionally, it would help fight the urban heat island effect'43 and
would lower health risks for large swaths of the population.

1391Id.
140 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS

2008 DATA, https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/ApilPubliclViewPublication/811160 (last visted
Oct. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZJ8W-2Q3W}; Policy Impact: Seat Belts, CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/seatbeltbrief/index.html
(last updated Jan. 21, 2014) [https://perma.cc5WA7-SKXW].
141 See generallyTom Gara, Trust The Label:Eco-FriendlyConsumers Really Do,
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Dec. 5, 2012, 4:39 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2012/12/05/trust-the-label-environmentally-conscious-consumers-really-do
[https://perma.cc/T5SL-XVSC.
142 See Gordon, supra note 45, at 1.
14 Bianca Nogrady, Urban heat islands: cooling things down with trees, green
roads and fewer cars (Feb. 20, 2016, 5:50 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2017/feb/2 1/urban-heat-islands-cooling-things-down-with-trees-green-roads-andfewer-cars [https://perma.cc/CW6U-WQQC].
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Furthermore, these proposed changes would give states a
powerful tool to aid in their achievement and maintenance of the
NAAQS. Congress acknowledged the potential benefits of giving
states more control over mobile emissions in Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation,
where the federal court wrote:
Prior to 1977, New York was limited in the
avenues that it could pursue to meet the NAAQS.
However, in that year Congress enacted § 177 of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7507, which altered the preexisting
preemption rule. § 177 allows states to 'adopt and
enforce for any model year standards relating to
control of emissions from new motor vehicles ... if:
(1) such standards are identical to the California
standards for which a waiver has been granted for
such model year, and (2) California and such State
adopt such standards at least two years before
commencement of such model year ... ' 42 U.S.C.

§

7507.
One of the principal reasons for the adoption
of § 177 was that by 1977 only a few states had met
the NAAQS for ozone, and many others had failed to
meet the carbon monoxide standard. § 177 gives
these nonattainment states the option of adopting
the California vehicle emissions program to support
their efforts to comply with the ozone and carbon
monoxide standards. 144
The changes proposed in this Note would provide states with
additional support in their efforts to comply with the NAAQS.

14 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 810 F.
Supp. 1331, 1338 (N.D.N.Y. 1993), modified on reconsideration,831 F. Supp. 57 (N.D.N.Y.
1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994).
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CONCLUSION

Justice Louis Brandeis, a Louisville, Kentucky native,
famously wrote in his New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann dissent:
[Tihe advances in the exact sciences and the
achievements in invention remind us that the
seemingly impossible sometimes happens. There are
many men now living who were in the habit of using
the age-old expression: 'It is as impossible as flying.'
The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in
invention, attest the value of the process of trial and
error. In large measure, these advances have been
due to experimentation... . To stay experimentation
in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may
be fraught with serious consequences to the nation.
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country. 14
This Note is mindful of Brandeis' wise words and advocates
an expansion of state experimentation that has proven useful in
the fight against mobile source emissions that threaten our health
and our planet. The risks of further human health effects-and of
reaching a point-of-no-return in the fight against global
warming-now calls for maximal effort from all branches of
government. This proposal should be adopted so states can pioneer
efforts to limit the devastating impact of mobile sources emissions.
If adopted, it alone will not be enough to reverse the course we find
ourselves on, but it will be one large step in charting a more
prosperous course.

11

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932).

